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       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 18-1861 
___________ 
 
RANDALL JENNETTE, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States Tax Court 
 (Tax Court No. 16-12713) 
Tax Court Judge: Robert P. Ruwe 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 15, 2018 
 
Before: CHAGARES, BIBAS and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November 6, 2018) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Randall Jennette appeals pro se from the final order of the United States Tax 
Court.  For the reasons detailed below, we will affirm. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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In 2012 and 2014, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) imposed penalties against 
Jennette for filing frivolous tax returns, and in 2012, the IRS also assessed an unpaid tax 
liability.  In an effort to collect, the IRS issued a notice of intent to levy.  After 
proceedings not relevant here, the IRS Office of Appeals issued a supplemental notice of 
determination sustaining the levy notice.   
Jennette challenged the supplemental notice in the Tax Court.  He argued that: 1) 
the IRS is a corporate entity unlawfully seeking to compel performance under its 
corporate rules; 2) federal tax law can only be applied under admiralty or maritime 
jurisdictions; 3) the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) provides a defense against the 
IRS under negotiable instruments law; and 4) Jennette is a secured creditor of the 
Secretary of the Treasury.  The Tax Court granted the Commissioner’s motion for 
summary judgment.  The Tax Court concluded that Jennette did “not directly address 
respondent’s determination to sustain the levy,” and instead raised only “tax protester 
type arguments,” which the Court declined to “painstakingly address.”  Tax Court Op. at 
10.  Jennette appealed. 
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1).  We review the Tax 
Court’s factual findings for clear error, and exercise plenary review of its conclusions of 
law.  PNC Bancorp v. Comm’r, 212 F.3d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 2000).  Where, as here, the 
underlying tax liability is not in issue, the determination of the IRS Office of Appeals in a 
collection due process (CDP) hearing is reviewed by both the Tax Court and the Court of 
Appeals for abuse of discretion.  See Kindred v. Comm’r, 454 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 
2006); Living Care Alts. of Utica v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 625-27 (6th Cir. 2005). 
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At the outset, we note that Jennette has not challenged the tax or penalty 
assessments or the CDP procedures in either of the briefs he has filed in this case.  
Therefore, as the Commissioner argues, Jennette has waived any claims concerning these 
decisions.  See, e.g., In re Surrick, 338 F.3d 224, 237 (3d Cir. 2003). 
In Jennette’s two briefs, which both cover largely the same ground, he seems to 
argue that federal courts’ jurisdiction is limited to admiralty or maritime law, that the 
UCC provides him with defenses against the IRS, that the Tax Court should have 
accorded res judicata effect to a judgment he obtained in state court, that he must have 
entered into a contract with the federal government for the IRS to have the authority to 
tax him, and that he has been falsely imprisoned.  These arguments lack merit. 
First, contrary to Jennette’s assertions, the jurisdiction of federal courts is not 
limited to admiralty and maritime law.  See United States v. Saunders, 951 F.2d 1065, 
1068 (9th Cir. 1991).  Further, the UCC provides no defense against federal tax 
collection.  United States v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 368 U.S. 291, 293–94 (1961); see 
also In re Spearing Tool & Mfg. Co., 412 F.3d 653, 657 (6th Cir. 2005).  His res judicata 
argument fails both because his state case involved different parties and because 
judgment was ultimately entered against him in that case.  See In re Iulo, 766 A.2d 335, 
337 (Pa. 2001) (listing elements of res judicata); Jennette v. Commonwealth, No. 1394 
MDA 2017 (Pa. Super. Ct. January 31, 2018).  Finally, Jennette’s assertion that he did 
not enter into a contract with the United States and thus is not subject to its taxing 
authority is a frivolous tax-protester argument.  See, e.g., Trowbridge v. Comm'r, 378 
F.3d 432, 432–33 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); see generally Sauers v. Comm’r, 771 F.2d 
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64, 66 (3d Cir. 1985) (concluding that appellant’s arguments, “typical of those asserted 
by ‘tax protesters,’” were “patently frivolous.”); IRS Notice 2010-33, 2010-17 I.R.B. 609 
(2010) (identifying common “frivolous positions”).1 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the Tax Court. 
 
                                              
1 To the extent that Jennette raises issues relating to his incarceration, a Tax Court action 
is not the proper vehicle for his concerns. Cf. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 
(1973) (explaining that “Congress has determined that habeas corpus is the appropriate 
remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their 
confinement”). 
